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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In the Respondent's Brief the State asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an
incorrect legal standard," contrary to ldaho code section 18-8005(8) and State v.
Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007), in arguing that his conviction for
actual physical control was not substantially conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.)
The State also argues that

Mr. Moore's argument that his guilty plea to actual physical

control was invalid is contrary to existing law and that counsel failed to cite directly
contrary authority.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) This Reply Brief is necessary to

address these assertions made by the State. Mr. Moore contends that the State has
misinterpreted section 18-8005(8) and Schmoll, and that a proper application
demonstrates that his conviction for actual physical control is not a substantially
conforming conviction.

Additionally, the State's representation that Mr. Moore's

argument that his guilty plea was invalid is contrary to existing law, misrepresents the
arguments made in the Appellant's Brief. Furthermore, a proper reading of the authority
cited by the State reveals that it is not directly contrary authority. Mr. Moore refers this
Court to his Appellant's Brief for his arguments on the remaining issues not addressed
in this Reply Brief.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict Mr. Moore of felony operating
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol?

ARGUMENT

The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Su~portThe Mr. Moore's
Conviction For Felonv Operatins A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol
A.

Introduction
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Moore argued that the district court erred in allowing

the State to use his prior conviction for actual physical control of a vehicle because it
was not a substantially conforming conviction, and that his guilty plea to this charge was
invalid because it was obtained without counsel. In its Respondent's Brief, the State
asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an incorrect legal standard" contrary to ldaho code
section 18-8005(8) and State v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007),
in arguing that his conviction for actual physical control was not substantially
conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) The State also asserts that Mr. Moore's
argument that his guilty plea to actual physical control was invalid is contrary to existing
law and that counsel failed to cite directly contrary authority. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-

8.)

Mr. Moore contends that the State has misinterpreted section 18-8005(8) and

Schmoll, and that a proper application demonstrates that his conviction for actual
physical control is not a substantially conforming conviction. Additionally, the State's
representation that Mr. Moore's argument that his guilty plea was invalid is contrary to
existing law, misrepresents the arguments made in the Appellant's Brief. Furthermore, a
proper reading of authority cited by the State as directly contrary authority establishes
that it is not directly contrary.

B.

The North Dakota Statute Was Not Substantiallv Conformincl With ldaho
Code 5 18-8004
In its Respondent's Brief the State asserts that Mr. Moore employed "an incorrect

legal standard," contrary to ldaho code section 18-8005(8) and State v. Schmoll, 144
ldaho 800, 172 P.3d 555 (Ct. App. 2007), in arguing that his conviction for actual
physical control was not substantially conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) The
State essentially argues that to determine whether a prior conviction for driving under
the influence is a substantially conforming conviction, the courts should focus solely on
the bare language outlining the elements of driving under the influence in the applicable
statutes, without regard to how these elements have been defined within the applicable
statute or by the courts. (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-6.) This argument misinterprets
Schmoll and ignores the remainder of § 18-8004 defining the elements of driving under
the influence.
In Schmoll, the ldaho Court of Appeals was asked to determine whether a felony
driving under the influence conviction in Montana, which would have been treated as a
misdemeanor conviction in ldaho if committed here, could be used as a prior felony to
enhance a subsequent driving under the influence conviction in ldaho to a felony. Id. at
805, 172 P.3d at 560. In its analysis, the Court looked at how several other jurisdictions
had determined whether a prior driving under the influence charge was substantially
conforming. Id. at 801-03, 172 P.2d at 556-58. The Court noted the distinction between
the approach in California, where the courts looked at the factual circumstances of the
underlying conviction in determining whether the conviction was substantially
conforming, and the approach taken in other jurisdictions, where the courts focused on

the elements of the offense rather than the underlying facts of the prior convictions or
the penalties for the convictions. Id. The Court of Appeals ultimately rejected the
approach taken by the California courts. Id. at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60.
Notably, in Schmoll, although the Court of Appeals did compare the elements
that constitute driving under influence in Montana and ldaho under the applicable
statues, implying they were substantially conforming, this was not the question before
the Court. Schmoll, 144 ldaho at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60. Instead the Court of
Appeals found that the question before it was whether the violation would result in a
misdemeanor or felony charge in ldaho, and that this question was "entirely
independent" from whether Montana's prohibition of driving under the influence
substantially conforms to Idaho's prohibition. Id. at 805, 172 P.3d at 560.
In the Respondent's Brief, the State contends that Schmoll either expressly or
implicitly rejected the idea that the Court should review how the applicable foreign
statute has been interpreted by the courts of that state to determine if it is substantially
conforming. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) However Schmoll did not reject this idea, but
in fact looked to how Montana had defined the elements of the crime through case law
and the applicable statute. Schmoll, 144 ldaho at 804, 172 P.3d 555 ("A person is
considered to be under the influence in Montana when his 'ability to safely operate a
vehicle has been diminished.' M.C.A. § 61-8-401(3)(a). Diminished in this contest
means 'reduced or to a lesser degree."') (quoting Stafe v. Polaski, 325 Mont. 351, 355,
106 P.3d 538, 542 (Mont. 2005)). Therefore, comparing how the elements of driving
under the influence have been defined in each state to determine whether they are
substantially conforming is not contrary to Schmoll. Furthermore, not looking to how a

jurisdiction has defined the elements of driving under the influence would lead to ldaho
courts essentially interpreting other state's statutes for them despite contrary
interpretations by that state.
The State's argument in the Respondent's Brief, also ignores other subsections
of ldaho Code section 18-8004 further defining the elements of driving under the
influence. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) As the State notes, under Idaho code section
18-8005(5), to be a substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, the violation of
law in another jurisdiction must substantially conform "to the provisions of section 188004, ldaho Code." However, the State only compares one provision of ldaho Code
section 18-8004, provision (l)(a), with the applicable North Dakota statute, despite the
language in ldaho code section 18-8005(5) applying it to all of ldaho code section 188004 provisions. This analysis ignores ldaho Code section 18-8004(5), specifically
stating that actual physical control "shall be defined as being in the driver's position of
the motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving." I.C. § 188004(5). It also ignores ldaho code section 18-8004(2), specifying that in ldaho a
person with a blood alcohol content below .08 cannot be prosecuted for driving under
the influence, unless they are also under the influence of drugs, driving a commercial
vehicle, or are a minor. I.C. 3 18-8004(2). The fact the legislature specifically sought to
limit or define certain elements in ldaho code section 18-8004 and section 18-8005(5)
states that a foreign conviction must substantially conform with the provisions of section
18-8004, not just subsection 18-8004(1)(a), indicates that the foreign conviction must be
substantially conforming with these definitions or limitations as well. Here, Mr. Moore's

underlying conviction for actual physical control was not substantially conforming with
either subsection 18-8004(2) or 18-8004(5). (See Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12, 13-14.)
Because the North Dakota elements for driving or being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while intoxicated are not substantially conforming with ldaho code section
18-8004, and would allow convictions in much broader circumstances than in ldaho, the
district court erred in denying Mr. Moore's motion in limine and allowing the North
Dakota conviction to be used to enhance Mr. Moore's DUI to a felony. Therefore, the
prosecution failed to present substantial competent evidence at the time of trial to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Moore was guilty of felony driving under the
influence.
C.

Mr. Moore's Guilty Plea In North Dakota Was Obtained Without A Knowinq
Voluntaw Waiver Of His Riqht To Counsel
In its Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Moore "argues that the state

had the burden of proving that his waiver of counsel in North Dakota was knowing and
voluntary," stating that this is contrary to law and that counsel failed to cite Tovar v.
Iowa, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) as directly contrary authority. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8

& n.3.) However, this was not the argument that was made in the Appellant's Brief and
Tovar is not directly contrary authority as the State asserts.
In the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Moore made the following argument regarding the
burden of proof to collaterally attack an uncounseled underlying conviction:
In order to make the required showing, the State is only obligated to
prove the existence of the convictions through copies of the judgments of
conviction or other evidence. Sfafe v. Coby, 128 ldaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d
762, 764 (1996). Once the State has met its burden, the defendant has
the burden of coming forward with some evidence that the conviction was
constitutionally defective. Id. However, if the defendant raises a triable

issue of fact that the defendant was not accorded all of their rights on the
previous convictions, the burden is then on the State to rebut the
defendant's evidence and prove there were no constitutional infirmities.
Miller, 131 ldaho at 295, 955 P.2d at 610; Sfafe v. Beloit, 123 ldaho 36,
37, 844 P.2d 18, 19 (1992).
(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.) This argument is clearly not that the State has the burden
to prove Mr. Moore's waiver was knowing and voluntary as the State asserts, but rather
an explanation of how the ldaho Courts determine the respective burdens of the State
and the defense.

Sfafe v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 295, 955 P.2d 603, 610 (Ct. App.

1997). The burden shifts first from the State to the defense, and then from the defense
to the State, only if a triable issue of fact is presented. Id. This standard was first
adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court in Sfafe v. Beloif, 123 ldaho 36, 37, 844 P.2d 18,
19 (1992) overruled on ofher grounds by Sfafe v. Weber, 140 ldaho 89, 90 P.3d 314
(2004) following the United State's Supreme Court's Opinion in Parke v. Raley, 506
U.S. 20 (1992) and has not been overruled by the ldaho Supreme Court. See Weber,
140 ldaho at 94, 90 P.3d at 319.
In Raley, the issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
Kentucky's standard for determining the validity of a prior conviction was
unconstitutional because the State was not required to carry the entire burden of proof.
See Raley, 506 U.S. at 22. Under Kentucky's standard, which is similar to the standard
adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court and argued by the Appellant in this case, the
burden begins with the State to demonstrate that the existence of the conviction; the
burden then shifts to the defense to produce evidence that his rights were infringed or
some procedural irregularity occurred; if the defendant does this, the burden shifts back
to the State to demonstrate that the judgment was entered in a manner protecting the

defendant's rights. Id. at 24. See Beloit, 123 ldaho at 37, 844 P.2d at 19; Miller, 131
ldaho at 295, 955 P.2d at 610; (Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.). The Court ultimately held
that this test did not infringe on the defendant's constitutional rights, leaving it up to the
states to determine exactly what procedures they would proscribe as long as it did not
infringe on the defendant's due process rights. Id. at 27-28.
Nothing in Tovaroverrules this holding by the Raley Court. See Tovar, 541 U.S.
77, generally.

The passage cited by the State from Tovar stating that "it is the

defendant's burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right
to the assistance of counsel,"' is simply applying the burden of persuasion applied by
the lowa courts in the collateral attack of an uncounseled conviction by the defendant.
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92 (citing Watfs v. Sfafe, 257 N.W.2d 70, 71 (lowa 1977).). As Tovar
originated in lowa, and, as noted in Raley, the Supreme Court has left it up to the states
to determine the procedures for implementing recidivism statutes, the Court would

naturally apply the applicable lowa law to determine what burden of persuasion applied
to which party. Raley, 506 U.S. at 27-28, Tovar, 541 U.S. at 92. Therefore, Tovar is not
directly contrary to the burdens of persuasion set forth in the Appellant's Brief, as the
State has attempted to assert.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Moore respectfully requests that his judgment of conviction for felony driving
under the influence be reversed because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction for the felony enhancement. Alternatively, he contends that his judgment of
conviction be vacated and his case remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
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